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PRIVATE ANTITRUST STANDING: A SURVEY AND
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW AFTER ASSOCIATED
GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides the potent remedy of treble
damages' to a party injured by any activity proscribed by the antitrust
laws.2 Despite the apparent breadth of section 4,3 courts limit potential
recoveries in several ways, 4 the most important of which is the amor-
1. After the trier of fact determines the amount of damages suffered by a victorious private
litigant, the court automatically multiples the award by three. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the policy reasons underlying treble damage awards,
see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
Private parties may also sue to enjoin activity which violates the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
Understandably, however, most private suits seek treble damages under § 4. L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 769 (1977). Although courts more readily grant standing to sue
to litigants seeking injunctive relief under § 26, see, e.g., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.
1983), this Note is limited to consideration of standing questions under § 4.
2. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act
provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id § 15(a). This section was originally enacted as § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210
(1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
3. Some courts have urged a literal reading of § 4. See, e.g., Vines v. General Outdoor
Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948). The legislative history of the Sherman Act
supports this position. The drafters envisioned private treble damage awards as "open[ing] the
door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws,
and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 CONG. REc. 9073
(1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). For a discussion of the Act's legislative history as it relates to
standing, see Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809, 811-13 (1977); Note, The 7hird Circuit's "FunctionalAnalysis" Patrolling the Portels to Treble
Damage Actions Brought Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 21 B.C.L. REV. 659, 661-62 (1980);
Comment, Consumer Standing in Antitrust Actions: Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 58 WASH. U.L.Q.
717, 720-21 (1980). See also Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirementsfor Antitrust Plaintffs: Judi-
cially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy. 4 U.S.F.L. REV. 205 (1970) (standing limita-
tions frustrate the clear purpose of § 4). See generally THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 13-30 (E. Kintner ed. 1978); H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-210 (1955).
4. The Supreme Court approved of judicial constraints on § 4 in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), when it stated: "The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in
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phous doctrine of antitrust standing.' Commentators blame the
Supreme Court for much of the confusion6 concerning the doctrine.'
concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all
injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." Id. at 263 n.14.
To sue successfully, a plaintiff must demonstrate an actual injury to business or property. The
requirement of an actual injury is the source of the much disputed "passing on" defense and
"indirect purchaser" doctrine created by the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The Court
held that indirect purchasers do not suffer an injury within the meaning of § 4. See 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 337c-e (1978); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 811. The
Court modified the doctrine in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) which held that
consumers have standing within § 4. The debate surrounding the "indirect purchaser" doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
Requiring injury to "business or property" limits the class of antitrust litigants in two ways.
First, plaintiffs precluded from entering into business in the market affected by the defendant's
violations are often denied recovery. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966). If, however, the potential entrant has taken sufficient steps
toward entry into the threatened market, courts allow suit. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated. 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983), reaTd on remand, 704
F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983); T.V. Signal Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 617 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1980);
Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
The "business or property" requirement also prevents suits where only non-commercial inter-
ests of the plaintiff are involved. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334b. Thus, a
state may not sue for injury to its general economy by reason of any activity in violation of the
antitrust laws. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); In re Multidistrict Vehicle
Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). Similarly, a taxpayer
may not sue for injuries to a municipality. See Ratliff v. Burney, 657 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1981);
Cosentino v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 433 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 336.
5. Antitrust standing is similar, but not identical, to constitutional standing. Constitutional
standing requirements are easier to satisfy than antitrust standing requirements, which more
closely resemble the requirement of proximate cause in torts. See infra notes 18-41 and accompa-
nying text. Many courts confuse the two causation requirements. See, e.g., La Chappel v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 721, 722-23 (D. Mass. 1950). See general y W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971).
To have standing under the Constitution, a plaintiff need only show an injury in fact. This
requires a palpable injury, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974), causally
linked to the defendant, see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972), and
availability of an adequate remedy, see Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Envtl. Study Groups,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 90-92 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-08 (1975). This constitutional
rubric is met by the antitrust plaintiff with a showing of "injury to business or property." Cause in
fact is rarely a problem to the antitrust plaintiff today and is not considered in this Note.
6. Antitrust standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act has been aptly described as a "decisional
morass." Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 840. See also Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521
F.2d 1142, 1147-51 (6th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292, 1298 (2d Cir. 1971) (Levet, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy
Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 1970) (Waterman, J., dissenting), cert.
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Until recently, the Court abdicated responsibility for antitrust standing
to the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,8 an approach which led to a
proliferation of standing tests and conflicting results.9
In two recent cases' ° the Supreme Court attempted to synthesize the
divergent standing tests." Part I of this Note describes the various
standing tests courts employ. Part II discusses the recent Supreme
Court cases and Part III predicts their effect on the law of antitrust
standing in each federal circuit. Understanding each circuit's approach
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1219
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1370
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970).
The commentators are equally critical. See, e.g., Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Proce-
dural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1971); Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4ofthe ClaytonAct: Determi-
nation of Standing in Light of the AllegedAntitrust Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 795 (1976); Sher-
man, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976); Tyler, Private
Antitrust Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 269 (1978); Letter from Elea-
nor M. Fox to Editors of New York University Law Review, reprinted in 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102
(1976).
7. See, e.g., Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 841-42; Note, Standing To Sue in Private
Antitrust Litigation. Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REV. 532, 533 (1977).
8. The Court's steadfast refusal to take a position on the antitrust standing tests took two
forms First, the Court occasionally declined explicitly to decide the standing issue. See, e.g.,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,745 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
Second, the Court often refused to grant certiorari in antitrust standing cases involving open con-
flicts between the circuits. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 388 (1981); Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 492 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Pa.), af'd,
648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page
Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1980); Engine Specialties, Inc.
v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1979); Solinger v. A. &
M. Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Lupia v. Stella
D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Pitchford v. PEPI,
Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Calderone Enter. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
9. For a discussion of the various standing tests developed by courts, see infra notes 20-59
and accompanying text. For inter-test conflicts, compare infra notes 23-32 (results under direct
injury test) with infra notes 37 (results under traditional target area tests), 38 (results under foresee-
able target area test), 44 (results under policy balancing test) & 57 (results under zone of interests
test). For intra-test conflicts, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 833-34.
10. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897
(1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
11. The Court's approach in Associated General takes elements from each of the traditional
standing tests described infra notes 16-59. See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
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to antitrust standing is essential for two reasons. First, the variety of
standing tests currently in use,' 2 coupled with the liberal venue provi-
sions of the antitrust laws,' 3 encourage forum shopping."4  Knowledge
of each circuit's approach to antitrust standing enables counsel to better
control the outcome of antitrust litigation. Second, the ambiguous na-
ture of the Court's recent pronouncements leaves much room for inter-
pretation of the new test by the circuit courts using their prior case
law.15 As a result, antitrust counsel must understand the past and cur-
rent law in order to anticipate its development.
I. TYPES OF STANDING TESTS
Courts have developed three approaches to antitrust standing: proxi-
mate cause, policy-balancing, and zone of interests. While these ap-
proaches often overlap in practice,' 6 they are conceptually distinct.17
12. See infra notes 16-59.
13. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any dis-
trict wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be
served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
Id. See supra note 2 for partial text of 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), the Clayton Act's private treble damage
award provision, which is to be read in conjunction with 15 U.S.C. § 22 for purposes ofjurisdic-
tion. Ohio-Scaly Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 429 F. Supp. 139, 141 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
Although substantial contacts are required, see ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 310
F. Supp. 739, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970), antitrust venue is liberally construed, see Learning Sys. Inc, v.
Sol Levin, 351 F. Supp. 532, 533 (E.D. Mo. 1972). The general test is that of whether the "average
businessman" would view the contacts as substantial. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Ra-
diator & Stafidard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 256 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Thus, sufficient "trans-
acted business" in the forum is easily shown. See, e.g., National Constr. Ass'n v. National Elec.
Contractors Ass'n Inc., 498 F. Supp. 510, 527 (D. Md. 1980) ($44,000 transaction in seven year
period sufficient); C.C.P. Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co., 354 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (transac-
tions of approximately $12,000-85,000, $14,000, and $15,000 each adequate); Illinois v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) ($45,000, $24,000, $8600 sales in
forum in three years sufficient). The absence of offices, agents, and real estate in the forum district
is not fatal. School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
14. See Lieberman, A Motion Picture Producer's Standing to Recover Treble Damages From a
Movie Distributorfor Block Booking, 1980 BEv. HILLS B.J. 185, 186; Note, supra note 7, at 532;
Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4 A ProverbialMystery, 77 DIcK. L. REV. 73, 83 (1972-73).
15. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
16. Courts often apply elements of several tests. A recent example is Blue Shield v. Mc-
Cready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). Though the Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt a standing
test, id at 476-78, the Court did identify the general inquiry by stating: "[W]e look. . . to the
physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff ....
Id at 478. The Court upheld the circuit court's grant of standing to an insured suing her insurer
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/6
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Courts originally drew upon the tort concept of proximate cause to
mark the limits beyond which a plaintiff's injury would be considered
too remote and standing denied.'8 As with proximate cause, courts use
a variety of result-oriented formulae' 9 to measure remoteness.
There are three basic standing tests based on the notion of proximate
cause.2" Courts first developed the "direct injury" test, which denies
standing to plaintiffs not in a direct relationship with the defendant.21
While the direct injury test does not require privity of contract between
the plaintiff and defendant,22 it is the most restrictive of the antitrust
for illegally refusing to cover the fees of psychologists when the fees of psychiatrists were covered.
The Court's reasoning included elements of the target area test, id at 479-80, the foreseeable
target area test, id, and the policy balancing test, id at 472-73.
17. Each category of tests focuses on a different aspect of statutory limitations. The proxi-
mate cause approach denies standing on the ground of the plaintiffs remoteness from the source
of the injury. As with proximate cause in tort law, this theory is grounded in notions of common
sense and fairness. Also as in tort law, the proximate cause approach requires a metaphysical
determination of when an injury is too tenuously linked to its cause. See infra notes 19-41 and
accompanying text. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 236-37, 244-46 (discussion of
proximate cause).
The policy balancing approach is based on the theory that the antitrust laws should enhance
social and economic goals. The focus is therefore on practical considerations of the effect of
granting standing in particular cases. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. See generally
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 858-83 (suggested policy balancing framework).
The zone of interests approach is borrowed from courts' efforts to delineate a standing test
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See infra notes 54-59 and accom-
panying text.
18. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477-78 & n.13 (1982).
19. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 842-44.
20. Courts and commentators disagree on the number of standing tests derived from the
concept of proximate causation. Cf., e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 666 (author describes seven tests).
21. The direct injury test originated in two early antitrust cases in which courts denied stand-
ing to shareholders of injured corporations. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir.
1910), Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
For a discussion of the origin and early application of the direct injury test, see 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334c; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 813-19; Note, supra note 3,
at 661-63 & nn.19-43.
Courts have generally abandoned the direct injury test, although similar results are still
achieved under the traditional target area test. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. The
direct injury approach may reemerge as a result of the Supreme Court's recent cases, which fo-
cused attention on the directness of the plaintiffs injury. Whether "directness" in this sense sig-
nals approval of the old approach remains to be seen.
22. Some courts required privity. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d
13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956); City of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971);
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259, 263 (E.D.S.C. 1965),
rev'd, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
Courts generally rejected this requirement as overly strict. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid
Washington University Open Scholarship
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standing tests. Under the direct injury test courts have denied standing
to suppliers,23 shareholders,24 patent licensors or franchisors, 25 credi-
tors,26 lessors,27 ultimate consumers,28 taxpayers,29 employees, 30 and as-
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Clark Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); FLM Collision
Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 543 F.2d
1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); In re Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59
F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 1973-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 74,680
(D. Conn. 1973). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334c; Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 3, at 819.
23. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), aj'g, 329 F. Supp.
823 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Al Barnett & Son, Inc.
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 4, §§ 339, 340a-e.
24. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Mendenhall v. Fleming Co., 504 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.,
434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp.,
397 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1963); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Peter v. Western
Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820
(C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Campo v. National Football League, 334 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. La. 1971);
Former Stockholders of Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. McNeil Corp., 325 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Ohio
1970), aj7d without opinion, 441 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1971); Moore v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,581 (N.D. Ga.), a~fdper curiam, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,746
(5th Cir. 1971); Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Gerli v.
Silk Ass'n of Am., 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
Courts have even denied standing to sole shareholders under the direct injury test. See, e.g.,
Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Martens v.
Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 193
F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907
(D. Mass. 1956).
See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 336d; Berger & Bernstein, supra note
3, at 815.
25. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur, Cos., 382
F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 341.
26. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Walder v. Paramount
Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of Am., 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y.
1929). But see Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel
Fiber Glass Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,974 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),rev'don other grounds, 534
F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 336c; Berger &
Bernstein, supra note 3, at 815-18.
27. See, e.g., Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aft'd, 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Erone v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389
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sociations suing on behalf of their members.3 1 Application of this test
is difficult because of problems inherent in identifying which injuries
are sufficiently "direct."32
The inherent difficulties in application and the restrictive nature of
the direct injury test led courts to create the more liberal "target area
test."33 Two variations of this test are currently in use.34 Both allow a
court to grant standing to a plaintiff within the area of the economy
endangered by the defendant's allegedly illegal acts.35 The traditional
target area test requires, in addition, that the defendant "aim at" the
plaintiff.36 This version of the test is difficult to apply because of the
problems inherent in defining the term "aim," which has led courts to
discuss the test using unhelpful, albeit colorful, metaphors.37
(S.D.N.Y. 1939), af'dper curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). But see Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969) (owner/lessor has standing); Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246
F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (lessor has standing). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 4, § 341; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 823-24.
28. See, e.g., United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 337; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at
825-30.
29. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 336b.
30. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). But
see Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 4, §§ 338-39; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 821-23.
31. See, e.g., Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d
1151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974); Farmer's Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942); Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n v. International Ass'n,
120 F. Supp. 93 (D.C. Cal. 1954); Alabama Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28
F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
32. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 819.
33. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334d; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3,
at 830.
34. Courts and commentators disagree how to classify variations of the target area test. See
supra notes 7, 8, & 21; 1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 1105, 1107-8 (1981).
35. An antitrust plaintiff has standing to sue under the target area test if he is "within that
area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particu-
lar industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
36. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334d.
Intent to injure the plaintiff, however, is a question of fact. Such intent is not a requisite ele-
ment of the traditional target area test. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 n.15
(1982); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980); Mulvey v. Samuel
Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. Inc. v. California-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir.
1976) (need not be "sitting on the bull's eye"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); In re Multidis-
trict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.) (not on "firing range"), cert. denied, 414
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The second variety of the target area test requires that the plaintiff be
a "foreseeable" victim of the defendant's allegedly anticompetitive con-
duct.38 This version of the test, created by the Ninth Circuit, 39 has
since achieved much popularity in other circuits.40 Despite its popular-
ity, courts and commentators criticize the foreseeable target area test on
both theoretical and practical grounds.4'
Dissatisfaction with proximate cause approaches led courts42 and
commentators43 to advocate a policy-balancing approach, in which
courts weigh competing antitrust policies on a case-by-case basis to de-
termine if a plaintiff has antitrust standing.' On one hand, the drafters
U.S. 1045 (1973); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970) ("hit
... squarely," not "sideswiped or struck by carom shot"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("direct line of fire"), aj'd an other
grounds, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); International Rys. of Cent.
Am. v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("rifle range metaphor...
excludes the shotgun"), af9'd, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
For a discussion of the application of the traditional target area test to particular types of plain-
tiffs, see infra notes 98, 106-11, 161-73, 211-20, 257-58 & 264-66 and accompanying text.
38. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334d; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3,
at 831.
39. In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cer. denied,
379 U.S. 880 (1964), the court stated that the "[p]laintiff must show ... [the] affected operation
was actually in the area which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspir-
acy." Id. at 220.
40. See infra notes 113-14, 140, 200 & 222 and accompanying text.
41. Professors Areeda and Turner argue that not all foreseeable injuries were intended to be
remediable under the antitrust laws. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 334d. This
criticism suggests that foreseeability is not strict enough. Berger and Bernstein argue that, because
antitrust violations are intentional, the use of the negligence-based theory of foreseeability is inap-
propriate. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 835. This criticism suggests that foreseeability is
too restrictive because the burden of proving intentional wrongs is less than the burden of proving
negligence,
As with other proximate cause based terms, foreseeability is hard to define. See Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 3, at 835.
42. The Third Circuit uses a functional approach in which it considers the policy impact of
granting standing to particular classes of antitrust plaintiffs. See supra notes 120-21 & 124. Other
circuits have increased the weight they give to policy considerations in making standing decisions.
See infra notes 145, 155, 201-03, 224, 237-39 & 252 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court,
in Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), gave an unusually important role to competing
antitrust policies. See supra note 16. In Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983), the Court expressly made policy a part of its antitrust stand-
ing test. See infra note 75.
43. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, §§ 334e-342; Berger & Bernstein,
supra note 3, at 858-83; Handler, supra note 6, at 30-31.
44. The policy-balancing approach is the standing test most tied to the particular facts of the
case at hand. Such an approach avoids the inflexibility of other standing tests which often force
facts into the narrow confines of prior case law. On the other hand, the flexibility of the policy-
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of what is now section 4 of the Clayton Act, and courts construing the
provision, recognized the importance of the private remedy for deter-
rence45 and compensation 46 purposes. On the other hand, several fac-
tors militate against unlimited access to the treble damage remedy.
Courts and commentators cite fears that unlimited access will result in
duplicative47 and ruinous recoveries, 48 windfalls to plaintiffs, 49 specula-
balancing test inhibits predictability in the standing area. Such uncertainty is especially frustrat-
ing in the field of antitrust where litigation is extraordinarily costly to pursue.
45. Drafters of both the Sherman and Clayton Acts were adamantly concerned with provid-
ing a remedy to the private litigant. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 845-50. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed the important enforcement role played by the treble damage rem-
edy. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); Pfizer, Inc. v India, 434 U.S.
308, 313 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381
U.S. 311, 318 (1965).
For scholarly discussion of the importance of treble damages for deterence, see 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 343; M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, H. GOLDSCHMIDT, & R. PITOFSKY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 153-54 (2d ed. 1983); Areeda,Antitrust Violations
Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1976); Berger & Bernstein, supra note
3, at 848-50; Handler, Antitrust - Myth & Realty in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 211,
239 (1975); Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar ofAntitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167,
168-69 (1958); Maclntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTITRUST
BULL. 113, 128-29 (1962); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in
Enforcement, 40 A.B.A. J. 1061, 1062 (1954); Note, Closing the Door on ConsumerAntitrust Stand-
ing, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 261-62 (1979); Comment, Denial of Standing to Private Noncommer-
cial Consumers Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1531, 1545-46 (1978);
Comment, supra note 3, at 726; Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061-62 (1952).
46. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,472 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1978); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,
454 (1957); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948).
Congress designed the treble damages remedy to protect the free enterprise system, see North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), and courts sometimes use the remedy to restore
a competitive market. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, § 343; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 846-48.
47. Duplicative recoveries are possible when a single antitrust violation injures many people
similarly situated (e.g., consumers and shareholders) or the general economy. In such a case,
courts usually deny standing. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Engine
Specialties Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, §§ 334c, 334-343; Berger & Bernstein,
supra note 3, at 850-51.
48. Ruinous recoveries, or "overkill," can occur when courts allow numerous, non-duplica-
tive awards. If the defendant is unable to bear the burden of such liability, these rewards can
hinder the overall competitive situation. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131
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tive awards, 50 and an avalanche of suits burdening the courts."' Under
the policy-balancing approach, courts recognize the unique nature of
each plaintiff's claim and discard the notion that an inflexible formula
is appropriate to every case. 2 In practice, courts use the policy-balanc-
ing approach to supplement other tests and provide a flexible compo-
nent to the determination of antitrust standing.53
Courts have derived the third distinct approach to antitrust standing
from the standing test used by administrative agencies and courts
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 4 To demonstrate
standing under the APA, the complainant must suffer an injury falling
within the zone of interests Congress sought to protect by the substan-
tive statute.5 Until very recently, the Sixth Circuit used the "zone of
interests" test. 6 The Sixth Circuit, however, created the test before the
Supreme Court promulgated the antitrust injury requirement.5 7
(5th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enter. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at
851-52.
49. Windfall recoveries result when a remotely situated plaintiff, although injured, is
awarded treble damages. The theory suggests that it is somehow unfair to compensate plaintiffs
for indirect injuries. For cases and analysis concerning the policy against windfall recoveries, see
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, §§ 334e-343; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 853-
54.
50. Though not a frequently invoked policy concern in antitrust litigation, courts sometimes
cite the danger of speculative damages to limit standing. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465, 475 (1982). Commentators argue that the danger is properly addressed in a challenge to
the adequacy of proof of damages, not in the preliminary determination of standing. 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 4, §§ 334e-343; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 854-55.
51. Courts fear opening the floodgates to antitrust litigation. See, e.g,, Mid-west Paper Prod.
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 587 (3d Cir. 1979); Calderone Enter. Inc. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
See also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 855-58.
52. Cf. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982) (limitations on standing only
permissible ifjustified in particular case).
53. See supra note 16.
54. Standing .before an administrative agency is governed by § 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), which grants standing to any person "aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Id.
55. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
56. See J.F. Reed Co. v. K-Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,501 (E.D. Mich.
1982). The Sixth Circuit recently replaced the zone of interests test with the approach outlined by
the Supreme Court in Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897 (1983). See Southaven Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hude, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (1983).
See generally infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
57. The Sixth Circuit adopted the zone of interests test in 1975 in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
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Though the courts in the Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish anti-
trust injury from the zone of interests test,58 the requirements are not
conceptually distinct.5 9
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In Blue Shield v. McCready,60 the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed a Fourth Circuit decision allowing a Blue Shield subscriber to
sue Blue Shield for failing to cover treatment by a psychologist while
reimbursing subscribers for services provided by psychiatrists. 6' In
finding that standing was appropriate under section 4 of the Clayton
Act,62 the Court stressed the plaintiff's status as a consumer.63 Though
it noted the myriad of antitrust standing tests currently employed by
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,' 4 the Court did not expressly
Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court announced the antitrust injury require-
ment in 1978 in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1978).
After Brunswick, only antitrust injuries are remediable under § 4 of the Clayton Act. An anti-
trust injury is one which the antitrust laws were designed to remedy. See 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 4, § 346. In Brunswick, the Court held that a plaintiff could not sue for
injuries caused by illegal acts which kept a competitor of the plaintiff in business. 429 U.S. at 496-
97. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's injury resulted from procompetative activity. Id.
58. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 893 (1981); J.F. Reed Co., v. K-Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,501 at 72,769
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
59. Under the zone of interests test, the plaintiff must show an "essential connection between
the injury and the aims of the antitrust laws." Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229,
1235 (6th Cir.) (quoting A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 388 (1981). Similarly, the antitrust injury requirement requires that
the plaintiff's "injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy
for violation of the antitrust laws." Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483 (1982).
60. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
61. Id. at 468. Plaintiff alleged that Blue Shield conspired with psychiatrists to exclude psy-
chologists from receiving compensation under Blue Shield plans. Such a conspiracy restrains
trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
62. 457 U.S. at 472.
63. The Court stated, "[W]e have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4 remedy."
Id The Court illustrated this broad reading of § 4 by referring to Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330 (1979). The Court stated:
[Reiter] rejected the argument that the § 4 remedy is available only to redress injury to
commercial interests. In that case we afforded the statutory term "property" its "natu-
rally broad and inclusive meaning," and held that a consumer has standing to seek a § 4
remedy reflecting the increase in the purchase price of a good that was attributable to a
price-fixing conspiracy.
457 U.S. at 473. See also Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,
103 S. Ct. 897, 908-09 (1982) (analyzing McCready).
64. 457 U.S. at 476 n.12.
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endorse any particular theory.65 The Court did, however, grant stand-
ing to the plaintiff because she fell within the target area of the econ-
omy endangered by Blue Cross' illegal conduct.6 6 This result seems to
adopt tacitly the target area approach to antitrust standing; alterna-
tively, the Court may have merely applied the antitrust standing test
employed by the lower court. Because of the ambiguity surrounding its
interpretation, McCready does little to clarify the law of antitrust
standing.67
In Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters,6" the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals which had granted a union standing to sue a
multi-employer association for conduct allegedly restraining the
union's business activities in violation of the antitrust laws.6 9  The
Court admitted that the defendant's actions probably violated the
law,70 but held that only individual union members could properly
bring suit.71
The Court identified several factors that should be considered in de-
termining if a claimant should be granted standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act:72 the nature of the plaintiffs injury,73 the directness
65. Id
66. Id at 480-81. The Court stated:
As a consumer of psychotherapy services entitled to financial benefits under the Blue
Shield plan, we think it clear that McCready was "within that area of the economy...
endangered by [that] breakdown of competitive conditions" resulting from Blue Shield's
selective refusal to reimburse.
Id (quoting Multdistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir. 1973)).
67. The Court stated, "We have no occasion here to evaluate the relative utility of any of
these possibly conflicting approaches toward the problem of remote antitrust injury." 457 U.S. at
476 n.12. Courts addressing the issue of antitrust standing after McCread continued to apply
their prior caselaw and standing tests. See infra notes 95-274 and accompanying text.
68. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
69. The union alleged that the association's members conspired with each other and non-
union members to weaken the union through various trade practices. These practices included
refusing to enter collective bargaining agreements and breaching existing collective bargaining
agreements. Id. at 899-902.
70. Id. at 903.
71. Id. at 913.
72. The Court reviewed the various approaches to standing used by the circuit courts of
appeal and stated: "In our view, courts should analyze each situation in light of the factors set
forth in the text infra." Id. at 908 n.33.
It is not clear whether the enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely illustrative. See
Southaven Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.9 (6th Cir. 1983).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 908. The Court concluded:
Set against this background, a union, in its capacity as bargaining representative, will
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of injury,74 and policy considerations.75 The Court set forth these fac-
tors because of the inconsistent results reached under the divergent
standing tests employed by the lower federal courts.76 Although sev-
eral courts have since adopted the Supreme Court's Associated General
standing analysis,77 the ambiguity inherent in the doctrine of antitrust
standing78 will probably continue to generate inconsistent results in the
frequently not be part of the class the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in
disputes with employers with whom it bargains. In each case its alleged injury must be
analyzed to determine whether it is of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to
forestall. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. .... In this case, particu-
larly in light of the longstanding collective bargaining relationship between the parties,
the Union's labor-market interests seem to predominate, and the Brunswick test is not
satisfied.
Id. at 910. The Brunswick test is the test of antitrust injury. See supra notes 57-59 and accompa-
nying text; infra note 94. To the extent that the antitrust injury and the zone of interests tests are
identical, see supra note 59 and accompanying text, Sixth Circuit cases decided under the zone of
interests test should provide an understanding of how courts will apply this factor of.4ssociated
General. See infra notes 175-80 & 185 and accompanying text.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 910. The union's claim inAssociated General failed to satisfy this require-
ment because there were other parties more directly affected by the association's illegal activities.
The Court stated:
The existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally moti-
vate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the justifi-
cation for allowing a more remote party such as the Union to perform the office of a
private attorney general. Denying the Union a remedy on the basis of its allegations in
this case is not likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.
Id. at 911. Because the inquiry focuses on remoteness, this factor incorporates the proximate
cause standing tests, though it does not purport to adopt any specific variation. See supra notes
18-41 and accompanying text.
75. Courts increasingly consider several policy factors germane to the determination of anti-
trust standing. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
In,4ssociated General, the Court determined that the following policy concerns militated against
granting standing to the union: the speculative nature of the damages, difficulty with judicial
management of the litigation's complexity, possibility of duplicative recoveries, and problems con-
cerning apportionment of damages. Id. at 911-12.
76. Id. at 907-08 n.33. For reference to previous inconsistent results, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
77. See Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., No. 83-7364 (2d Cir. Dec. 12,
1983); McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983); Chelson v. Orego-
nian PubI. Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983); Southaven Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1983); In re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., No. 534 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1983).
78. The Court admitted the impossibility of establishing a rigid standing test when it com-
pared antitrust standing to proximate cause in tort law. The Court stated:
It is common ground that the judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable harm
that can be traced to alleged wrongdoing. In both situations the infinite variety of claims
that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dic-
tate the result in every case. Instead, previously decided cases identify factors that cir-
cumscribe and guide the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a
remedy in specific circumstances.
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federal circuits.79
This intrinsic inconsistency springs in part from courts' inability to
define the scope of proximate cause as an element of antitrust standing.
Almost all federal circuit courts already require proximate cause, yet
reach differing results depending on their formulation of the test of re-
moteness.80 Because the Supreme Court's suggested approach estab-
lishes no specific formula for determining remoteness of injury, courts
are likely to adhere to their current proximate cause formulation.
Some circuits appear to have abandoned their old standing tests en-
tirely;81 others may explicitly incorporate their own tests, 82 or may pur-
port to adopt the Supreme Court's approach while continuing to apply
their own case law.8 3
Despite its failure to resolve the disputes surrounding antitrust stand-
ing, the approach recommended by the Supreme Court in Associated
General does have important ramifications. An important aspect of the
Court's approach is the explicit adoption of policy considerations as
relevant to antitrust standing.84 This factor has gained considerable ac-
ceptance in the circuits.8 Although balancing policy considerations is
a salutory move away from overly rigid standing tests,8 6 it necessarily
enhances the likelihood of conflicting lower court results.8
Additionally, in denying the union standing to sue, the Court noted
Congress' desire in adopting section 4 of the Clayton Act to protect
103 S.Ct. at 907-08.
79. The Supreme Court remanded several cases for reconsideration in light of Associaled
General. See Crocker Co. Inc. v. Ostrofe, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983), remanding 670 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1982); Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983),
remanding 677 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1983). In each of these cases, the court of appeals can apply the
Supreme Court's standing test and reach the same result as before the remand. See infra notes 102
& 154 and accompanying text.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 907-08 n.33. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
81. See e.g., Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., No. 83-7364 (2d Cir. Dec.
12, 1983); Southaven Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983).
82. This is the approach of at least one court in the wake of Associated General. See Magic
Chef, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 561 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. 111. 1983). The court acknowledged
Associated General, but nevertheless applied the Seventh Circuit's target area test. See infra notes
207-09 and accompanying text. See also Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Construc-
tion Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983).
83. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 42 & 45-49 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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consumers.88 This emphasis reiterates the Court's position in Mc-
Cready.89 In Associated General, however, the Court denied standing
to plaintiffs because they were not consumers. It is likely that some
courts will use the consumer protection rubric similarly, to limit the
class of antitrust plaintiffs granted standing.90
Finally, prior to Associated General, though the cases were by no
means unanimous, most courts and commentators regarded antitrust
injury as a factor distinct from antitrust standing.9' Even in cases ad-
dressing both antitrust injury and antitrust standing, courts evaluated
the requirements separately.92 Now, in light of the Supreme Court's
suggestion that a court should balance antitrust injury with other stand-
ing factors,9 3 it seems theoretically possible for courts to permit suits by
plaintiffs who have suffered no antitrust injury if proximate cause and
policy factors weigh strongly enough in their favor.94
III. APPLICATION OF TESTS BY CIRCUIT
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit employs the traditional target area test to limit pri-
vate antitrust standing.95 The most recent case decided by the court of
appeals is Engine Specialities, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd 96 Though the
case primarily concerned the antitrust injury requirement of section 4,
the court made clear its acceptance of the traditional target area test.97
88. 103 S. Ct. at 908-09. The Court stated: "As the legislative history shows, the Sherman
Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price competition, and our prior cases have
emphasized the central interest in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant
market." Id.
89. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
90. See McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983) (Associated
General read as requiring plaintiff suing under § 4 be either a consumer or a direct competitor of
defendant); United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., No. 4-82-990 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1983).
91. Though courts often confused antitrust injury with standing, antitrust injury presented a
distinct requirement under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4,
§ 346.
92. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
93. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
94. From a practical standpoint it is unlikely that a court would grant standing in the absence
of antitrust injury. Antitrust injury commonly requires prohibited conduct detrimental to compe-
tition. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1978); supra note 57. Courts proba-
bly would not entertain a suit alleging that pro-competative actions violate the antitrust laws.
95. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 n.14 (1982).
96. 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
97. The court in Bombardier stated: "Recovery of treble damages is potent ammunition in-
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The First Circuit has applied this test in a strict manner, granting
standing to an insured doctor, but not to a distributor.98
Unlike other circuits, the First Circuit only recently adopted the tar-
get area test, relying previously on the direct injury test.99 The unusual
resilience of the direct injury approach in the First Circuit is probably
attributable to the fact that this circuit created the test. 1°° The circuit's
courts have reaffirmed their allegiance to this approach several
times. 1 1
While the First Circuit has yet to address the standing question in
the aftermath of Associated General, its current approach is consistent
with the Court's recent decisions. 02 As a result, it is unlikely that the
circuit's approach to antitrust standing will change significantly after
tended not only to protect the aggrieved, but to deter the wrongdoer. The courts have attempted
to keep the range of the barrage within the target area thought to have been intended by Congress
in passing the antitrust legislation." Id. at 17.
98. Compare Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979), cer.
denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (distributor of injured party without standing because hit but not
aimed at) with Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977), a/I'd, 438 U.S.
531 (1978) (insured doctors have standing to sue insurance company).
99. See, eg., Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 377 F. Supp. 1294 (D. Mass. 1974)
(fishermen lack standing to sue insurance company boycotting their services), mod.Fled, 512 F.2d 4
(1st Cir. 1975).
100. See Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (D. Mass. 1909).
101. See Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp., 230 (D. Mass.) (salesman with-
out standing to sue manufacturer for negotiating directly with buyer and eliminating salesman's
commission), a/I'd, 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.
Supp. 299 (D. Mass.) (insurance broker without standing to sue insurance company for conspiring
with insurance commission to give contract to competitor of company broker hoped to represent),
afdper curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Snow Crest Beverages,
Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956) (third party without standing to sue
for injury to party in privity with plaintiff).
102. While the First Circuit may change the wording of their traditional target area test, the
results are not likely to change dramatically. The First Circuit already requires antitrust injury
pursuant to Brunswick, see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text, though it does not balance
the requirement with other standing considerations as proposed by Associated General. For a
discussion of the likely affect of balancing antitrust injury, see supra notes 91-94 and accompany-
ing text.
The second component of the Supreme Court's balancing approach concerns the proximate
cause of the injury. Because the First Circuit already evaluates proximate cause through use of
the target area test, Associated General will probably not significantly affect standing disputes in
this circuit. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's standing analysis emphasizes the importance of the policy implications of
granting or denying standing. While the traditional target area test does not include an evaluation
of policy questions, many courts currently supplement their own tests with such an evaluation.
Seesupra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. Although a policy analysis seemingly makes stand-
ing tests more flexible, it does not significantly affect results because courts tend to use policy
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Associated General. Courts in the First Circuit may now discuss policy
concerns in their evaluation of standing, but are likely to do so simply
to reinforce conclusions reached under the target area test.10 3
B. Second Circuit
From 1967 until very recently, the Second Circuit also used the tradi-
tional target area test to evaluate standing to sue under section 4.1'
Prior to 1967, the circuit employed the direct injury test, which it ap-
plied in a very conservative manner.'05 The circuit's shift to the tradi-
tional target area test, 106 however, did not produce results appreciably
different from those achieved using the direct injury test. Under the
traditional target area test the Second Circuit continued to deny stand-
ing to patentees, 10 7  lessors, 0 8  suppliers, 0 9  purchasers," 0  and
licensors. I'
Until 1980, courts in the Second Circuit routinely rejected the for-
arguments in a result-oriented manner, to bolster predetermined conclusions. See supra notes 84-
88.
103. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
104. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 n.14 (1982).
105. See Note, supra note 7, at 536-37.
106. See Data Digest, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (em-
ployee with standing). See also SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.) (3d
party in privity with victim has no standing), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
Courts in the Second Circuit have applied the direct injury test as recently as 1972. See, e.g.,
GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g, 329 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969); United Egg Producers v. Bauer
Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
107. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943
(1969).
108. Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
109. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970),petition for cert. dis-
missed, 413 U.S. 901 (1971); Levitch v. C.B.S., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 697
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 362
(1982); Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 916 (1981); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cer.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). But see Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553
F.2d 793 (2d Cir.) (potential buyers of employer's vessels were targets of provision of bargaining
agreement that if employers sold a vessel to an American flag shipper not already under contract
with union, the ship would be sold with a crew provided by union), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923
(1977),
111. Western Geophysical Co. of Am., Inc. v. Bolt. Assocs., 584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978).
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seeability approach to the target area test pioneered by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.112 In Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America,t" 3 however, the court
of appeals made frequent reference to Ninth Circuit cases in holding
that an indirect purchaser is a "target" of a seller's price discrimination
if there is evidence to show that the discrimination foreseeably affected
the indirect purchaser.'1 4
Schwimmer sparked concern among the circuit's district courts that
the court of appeals would adopt the foreseeable target area test." t5
The district courts have not applied the foreseeable target area test in
light of Schwimmer." The court of appeals, however, never addressed
the post-Schwimmer controversy." 7  The court appears to have
adopted the Supreme Court's new approach to antitrust standing in
Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.' 8 In Crimpers, the
circuit court granted a boycott victim standing under section 4, finding
he met the requirements set forth in Associated General."9
C Third Circuit
The Third Circuit employs a balancing approach to antitrust stand-
ing" in which a variety of factors are analyzed on a case-by-case ba-
sis.12' The Third Circuit first enunciated its balancing test in Cromar
112. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F.
Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
113. 637 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 362 (1982).
114. Id. at 423.
115. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pollack v.
Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
116. See supra cases cited note 115.
117. In GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the district
court followed Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981), erroneously declaring Reading to be the most recent court of appeals
case in the circuit. 519 F. Supp. at 1221.
118. No. 83-7364 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1983).
119. The Second Circuit read McCready as liberalizing standing requirements under the tar-
get area test;Associated General did not undermine McCready, according to the court. Id Pecu-
liarly, however, the court then rejected the target area test and limited two important target area
cases to their facts. Id
120. Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547 n.12 (1982). The test is alternatively
labelled a "balancing approach," "factual matrix," and "functional approach."
121. Id. This approach rejects the fundamental premise of the proximate cause approaches
that a uniform standard is applicable to all cases. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equioment Corp.,'2 2 after reviewing the dis-
parate results achieved using the direct injury and target area tests.' 2 3
Under the circuit's balancing approach, a court considers the plaintiff's
relationship to the defendant, the plaintiff's position in the area of the
economy threatened by the defendant's alleged violation, the effect of
the alleged violation on the plaintiff, the nature of the industry, and
competing policy concerns.'24
Since Cromar, the Third Circuit has twice employed the balancing
approach. In Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Industries,'25 the court al-
lowed a manufacturer's sales representative to sue two manufacturers
for exclusive dealing and attempted imposition of territorial restric-
tions. 126 Applying the Cromar factors, the court found that the alleged
violations affected the plaintiff directly, and that the defendants' con-
spiracy "aimed" at the plaintiff.'27
The most recent Third Circuit standing decision is Mid-west Paper
Products Co. v. Continental Group.2' In Mid-west, the court denied
standing to two classes of plaintiffs: indirect purchasers,129 and a plain-
tiff who had no direct relationship with the defendants, even though he
was a direct purchaser of a competitor of the defendants. 3 °
Several district courts in the Third Circuit have applied the balanc-
ing approach, with mixed results. Courts have granted standing to a
member of a professional association suing the association,' 3 ' employ-
ees,' 32 and the owner of a football club suing for injury to the club; 33
122. 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
123. Id at 506. For a discussion of the development of antitrust standing in the Third Circuit
prior to adoption of the balancing test, see id. at 506; Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp.
550, 553-56 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Note, supra note 3, at 659; Note, supra note 7, at 539.
124. 543 F.2d at 508. See also Mid-west Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573
(3d Cir. 1979); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Randolph Assocs. v.
Wakefern Food Corp., 527 F. Supp. 599 (D.N.J. 1981); Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 492 F. Supp. 246
(E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). See generally Note,
supra note 3. at 676-79.
125. 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
126. Id at 100.
127. Id
128. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979). In Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d
Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit discussed McCready and Associaled General, but only in connection
with the indirect purchaser doctrine of Illinois Brick. See supra note 4.
129. Id at 578-80.
130. Id at 587.
131. Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1978).
132. Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982); McNulty v. Bor-
den, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But see Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp.
Number 41 1087
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they have also denied standing to shareholders 134 and consumers.131
By balancing factors which incorporate the directness 136 and policy 137
requirements of Associated General, the Third Circuit's approach
closely follows the Supreme Court's recommended analysis. The cir-
cuit fails only to consider antitrust injury as an element of standing. 38
Incorporation of this element would not significantly change the results
reached under the Third Circuit's current approach.139
D. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently adhered to the
foreseeable target area test of antitrust standing. 40 The court of ap-
peals first addressed antitrust standing in South Carolina Council of
Milk Producers v. Newton.' 4 ' The court adopted the foreseeable target
area test 142 and granted standing to raw milk producers who lost profits
as a result of a conspiracy by retailers to sell milk as loss leaders. 143
The court of appeals reaffirmed the Newton approach in 1981 in Rat-
lilv. Burney.1" In the interim, the Federal District Court in Maryland
twice suggested that courts balance competing antitrust policies to sup-
plement the circuit's foreseeable target area test. 145
550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (conjectural damages not within target area tip balance against granting
standing); Herrin v. L.M. Collins & Assocs., 483 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (employee without
antitrust injury).
133. Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 492 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd, 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
134. Athlete's Foot Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35 (D. Del. 1977).
135. Mid-west Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
136. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 57-69 & 73 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
140. Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 654 (D. Md. 1979), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 909 (1981).
141. 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
142. Id at 419. The court stressed both causation and foreseeability:
The pivot of decision presently is whether the defendants' asserted conduct was the
proximate cause of the plaintifi's asserted injury. If the damage was merely incidental or
consequential, or if the defendants' antitrust acts are so removed from the injury as to be
only remotely causative, the plaintiffs have not been injured "by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws" as contemplated by the Clayton Act.
Id.
143. Id at 418-19. A "loss leader" involves the sale of one item at an unprofitable price to
induce purchase of another item.
144. 657 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1981) (reaffirming Newton without stating test).
145. Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979) (urging adoption of
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Most recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in McCready v. Blue Shield.14 6 Under the foreseeable target area
approach, the Fourth Circuit grants standing to buyers, 147 consum-
ers,' 48 sellers, 149 and distributors. 5  Courts in the Fourth Circuit have
denied standing to taxpayers' 51 and patent holders suing for
infringement. 5
2
Courts in the Fourth Circuit have not addressed the issue of antitrust
standing in the aftermath of Associated General. While other circuits
have abandoned the forseeable target area test in light of Associated
General,153 the test is not necessarily inconsistent with the Court's rec-
ommended approach.' 54 As such, the status of the law in the Fourth
Circuit is unclear.
E. Ffth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's recommended analy-
sis in Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. ," which
Third Circuit's balancing approach), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981); Midway Enter., Inc. v.
Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974) (urging policy component to target area
test).
146. 649 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1981), afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982). See supra notes 60-67 and
accompanying text.
147. Midway Enters. Inc. v. Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974).
148. McCready v. Blue Shield, 649 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1981), a'd, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
149. South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
150. Hughes Automotive, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrs., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Md.
1982).
151. Ratliffv. Burney, 657 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1981).
152. Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
909 (1981).
153. See, e.g., Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office Inc., No. 83-7364 (2d Cir. Dec.
12, 1983) (movement toward foreseeable target area test halted); Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing
Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983) (Associated General factors utilized).
154. Associated General reversed a grant of standing under the foreseeable target area test.
The case can be read as disapproving a particular application of the foreseeability approach,
rather than as a repudiation of the test itself. The only difference between the traditional and the
foreseeable target area tests is their wording of the directness requirement. See supra notes 34-42
and accompanying test. Under the foresecability approach, the harm to the plaintiff must have
been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Id This test does not require the defendant to
actually know of or intend harm to the plaintiff. Id. Intent is irrelevant to antitrust standing.
Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908 (1983);
Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2548 (1982). The Supreme Court's standard of direct-
ness, or proximate cause, is broad enough to include the foreseeable target area test. See supra
notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
155. 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983).
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had been remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light
of Associated General. It is not clear, however, that Associated General
will alter the Fifth Circuit's antitrust standing analysis.1 5 6 After adopt-
ing the Supreme Court's suggested approach,157 the Fifth Circuit reaf-
firmed its prior decision in Mitsui.58
Prior to Mitsui, the Fifth Circuit courts took divergent approaches to
antitrust standing. 59 Most courts, however, applied the traditional tar-
get area test.' 60  In 1976 the court of appeals supplanted the direct in-
jury test by explicitly applying the target area test in Tugboat, Inc. v.
Mobile Towing Co. 161
Under the traditional target area test, some courts in the Fifth Circuit
use a two-step procedure to evaluate antitrust standing questions.
First, these courts identify the area of the economy endangered by the
allegedly illegal conduct. Second, the courts determine if the plaintiff's
injury is within that target area or if the defendant "aimed at" the
plaintiff. 162
156. Because the Fifth Circuit's traditional target area test, see infra note 160 and accompany-
ing text, is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's wording of the test of antitrust standing, the
Fifth Circuit will probably continue to draw upon its own case law for guidance. See supra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
157. 704 F.2d at 786. The Fifth Circuit stated:
Because of the Court's analysis of antitrust injury and the necessary causal connection
between violation and injury for recovery, our discussion of standing [prior to remand]
was faulty. Whether or not the inquiry is termed "antitrust standing," the Court teaches
the appropriateness of an initial evaluation of plaintiff's harm, the alleged wrongdoing
by the defendants, and the relationship between them tested by the Court's explication of
relevant factors of antitrust redress.
Id.
158. Id.
159. See Note, supra note 7, at 541-43.
160. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547 n.12 (1982).
161. 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g, 398 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1975). The court of
appeals reversed the lower court's denial of standing to a union and tugboat employees who
sought to sue the employer and a competing union for conspiring to provide cheap labor. The
district court had used the direct injury test. Id at 1174.
162. See, e.g., In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1982);
Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct.
1244 (1983); Guzik v. State Bar, 659 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1981); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon
Corp., 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Larry R. George Sales Co. v.
Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1979); Yoder Bros. Inc. v. California-Fla. Plant Corp., 537
F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d
1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Hardwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 443 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Tex.), aft'd, 589 F.2d
806 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); In re Yarn Process Patent Validity & Anti-
trust Litig. 398 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
685 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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Other courts in the circuit require that the plaintiff show a "proxi-
mate" injury in addition to the above requirements. 163  Because the
target area approach necessarily involves an analysis of the remoteness
of the plaintiff's injury, 1" any difference in these formulations of the
target area test is superficial. Whether or not they explicitly require a
showing of proximate injury, courts usually grant standing to lessors, 165
insurees,166 frustrated market entrants, 167 and employees. 168  Courts in
the Fifth Circuit have denied standing to manufacturer's representa-
tives, 169 parties related to the immediate victim, 170 consumers, 171 and
associations suing on behalf of their members. 72 These results indicate
that the Fifth Circuit interprets the traditional target area test more
liberally than other circuits.173
F Sixth Circuit
In 1975 the Sixth Circuit abandoned the direct injury and target area
tests 174 in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp. ,175 adopting in their place the
163. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1110 (1975); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Tim W. Koer-
ner & Assoc., Inc. v. Aspen Labs Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aftd without opinion, 683
F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1982); Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Buchwald, 399 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla.
1975), aft'd, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Tugboat, Inc. v.
Mobile Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1975), rey'd, 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976);
Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ga. 1975), at'd, 535
F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
164. See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
165. Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
166. Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1110 (1975).
167. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), vacated, 103 S.
Ct. 1244 (1982).
168. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile
Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); Freeman v.
Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1975). But see Ingram v. South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp. 65 (D. Miss. 1980) (no antitrust injury when termination from reduction in
competition).
169. Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1979); Tim W.
Koerner & Assoc., Inc. v. Aspen Labs, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aj'd without opin-
ion, 683 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1982).
170. Buckley Towers Condo. Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1121 (1977).
171. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
172. Chatham Condo. Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1979).
173. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
174. The Sixth Circuit formerly used both the direct injury and target area tests. For examples
of the direct injury test, see Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th
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zone of interests test.176 Until recently, courts in the Sixth Circuit con-
tinued to follow the zone of interests test1 77 despite widespread criti-
cism of its transplantation from administrative law.17 8 For example, in
198 1, in Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp. , 79 the court held that a seller
of air conditioners who alleged antitrust injury fell within the zone of
interests Congress sought to protect in passing the antitrust statutes.180
The Sixth Circuit recently abandoned the zone of interests test in
favor of the Supreme Court's new standing approach. In Southaven
Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc.,' the court of appeals read
McCready and Associated General together and denied a lessor stand-
ing to sue a lessee for refusing to honor an agreement to cancel the
lease, allegedly in restraint of trade. 8 2 The court held that the plain-
tiff's injury was not sufficiently direct to meet the new test's require-
ments.18 3 In a subsequent case, the Sixth Circuit denied a shareholder
standing under section 4, overruling Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp. 114
These results, however, are not appreciably different from those
achieved under the zone of interests test. 8 5
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Former Stockholders of Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v.
McNeil Corp., 325 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Ohio 1970), af'd without opinion, 441 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir.
1971). See general, Note, supra note 7, at 543-45.
175. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
176. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit applied the zone of
interests test in two steps. First, the plaintiffmust show injury in fact. Second, "the interest sought
to be protected. . . (must be) arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute. . . "521 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 151, 153 (1970)).
177. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1981); J.F. Reed Co., Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,501 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
178. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
179. 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
180. Id. at 1235.
181. 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983).
182. Id at 1085-88.
183. Id
184. Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1983).
185. In another case, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio applied the new
standing test and granted standing to an employee of a defunct newspaper. Province v. Cleveland
Press Publ. Co., 571 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
Under the zone of interests test, the Sixth Circuit granted standing to employees but not to
representatives. See J.F. Reed Co., Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,501 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (manufacturer's representative is within zone of interests but without standing due to
lack of antitrust injury); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (former
employee had standing to sue on the basis of lost employment opportunity).
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G. Seventh Circuit
Historically, the Seventh Circuit has taken a liberal approach to anti-
trust standing.'86 Since the decision in Roseland v. Phister Manufactur-
ing Co. ,' in which the court permitted a sales agent to sue his former
employer, 88 the Seventh Circuit has expanded the class of plaintiffs
accorded standing under section 4. Parties with standing include em-
ployees, 89 lessors, 190 consumers,' 9' and distributors. 92
Courts in the Seventh Circuit have generally employed the target
area approach.' 93 Recently, however, these courts have disagreed
about the proper antitrust standing analysis. 9 4 In Repp v. .E. L. Publi-
cations, Ltd,'9 the court of appeals declared that the circuit had not
yet chosen between the direct injury and target area tests. 19 6  The
court's indecisiveness makes little difference, however, for it held that
the two tests are identical.' 97
Other recent court of appeals 9 8 and district court' 99 cases explicitly
186. See Note, supra note 7, at 545.
187. 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
188. Id. at 418-19.
189. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967). But see Perry v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (employee lacks standing because firing not
direct result of alleged violations).
190. Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
191. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rey'g, 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But see Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'I Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holders of bank's charge cards without standing to sue another bank for conspiracy
regarding issuance of cards), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1615 (1982).
192. Warner Management Consultants v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Il. 1982).
193. See Note, supra note 7, at 545.
194. See Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 469 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
195. 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982).
196. Id. at 444-45.
197. Id. at 447.
198. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1261 (1983); Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 469 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1610 (1982); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
199. Compare Warner Management Consultants v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 963
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (foreseeable target area test); Ohio-Scaly Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 545 F.
Supp. 765, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (foreseeable target area test) with Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-90 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (traditional target area test); General Beverage Sales
Co. v. East Side Winery, 396 F. Supp. 590, 596 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (modified traditional target area
test).
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utilize the target area test, though it is unclear to what degree foresee-
ability is an element of standing in the Seventh Circuit.2 0°° Addition-
ally, courts in the Seventh Circuit increasingly rely upon policy
considerations in evaluating the standing of particular litigants. In In
re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation211 the court of appeals balanced
the competing policy concerns of deterrence and avoidance of excessive
damages202 and denied standing to a corporation's president termi-
nated and blacklisted for engaging in pro-competitive activities in con-
travention of his company's allegedly illegal policies.20 3 Industrial Gas
conflicts with a Ninth Circuit case, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. 2 4 The
Supreme Court refused to hear Industrial Gas, and vacated and re-
manded Ostrofe in light of Associated General.205 Associated General
will not necessarily eliminate this conflict because each circuit can reaf-
firm its prior result under the Supreme Court's suggested antitrust
standing approach.20 6
In Magic Chef, Inc. v. Rockwell International Corp. ,2o7 the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois cited Associated Gen-
eral and applied the target area test,208 thereby explicitly incorporating
its own test into the Supreme Court's suggested standing approach.20 9
200. Compare Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.) (fore-
seeable target area test), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1610 (1981) with In re Industrial Gas Antitrust
Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982) (traditional target area test), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983)
and Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978) (traditional target area test),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
201. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
202. Id at 520. See supra notes 45 & 47-50 and accompanying text.
203. 681 F.2d at 515.
204. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). See infra notes 229-40 and
accompanying text.
205. In re Industrial Antitrust Gas Litig., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. deniedsub nom.
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker, Inc., 670 F.2d 1378
(9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
206. See supra note 154.
207. 561 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The court granted a potential purchaser standing to
sue a producer for a joint venture allegedly in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
208. Id. at 737. The court stated:
[Tihe causal relationship between Rockwell's conduct and Magic Chefs injuries was
direct enough to satisfy the "target area" requirement. See Associated General Contrac-
tors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907-08,
909-10 (1983), which in the course of denying antitrust standing to a union plaintiff re-
confirmed the standing of customers who are direct victims of the coercive practices
Id.
209. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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A later case, also from the Northern District of Illinois, adopted the
standing approach of Associated General.2"' The court of appeals,
however, has not yet passed on the issue.
H. Eighth Circuit
Until recently the status of antitrust standing in the Eighth Circuit
was unclear. In Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergans Farm Dairy,2' the
court of appeals allowed a milk producer to sue a competitor of one of
its buyers. Though the court failed to identify explicitly the standing
test it employed,212 most courts read the decision as approving the tar-
get area test as formulated by the Ninth Circuit213 in Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Corp. 214 In Karseal, the Ninth Circuit required the de-
fendant to "aim" at the plaintiff.2 15 Under this test, the Eighth Circuit
has granted standing to producers suing competitors of their custom-
ers,216 lessors,2 17 associations,218 employees, 219 and consumers.
220
Recently, the Eighth Circuit consensus on antitrust standing has bro-
ken down. Since 1978, courts have analyzed antitrust standing using
the target area test,22' the foreseeable target area test,222 the direct in-
210. In re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., No. 534 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1983) (parties
agreed to apply Associated General factors).
211. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
212. Id at 688-89.
213. See, e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1208 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108 (1983); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1379-
80 (D. Minn. 1982); McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 537 F. Supp. 1282, 1325 (D. Minn. 1982),
vacated, No. 82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 934-35
(D. Minn. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 1077 (1978), rev'don other grounds, 442 U.S. 330 (1979); H.F.&S.
Co. v, American Standard, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (D. Kan. 1968); Johnson v. Ready-Mix
Concrete Co., 318 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Neb. 1970); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 299
F. Supp. 596, 602 (D. Minn. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 438 F.2d 1380 (8th Cir. 1971).
214. 221 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1955).
215. Id. at 362.
216. See Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
217. See Johnson v Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 318 F. Supp. 930 (D. Neb. 1970).
218. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2108 (1983).
219. See McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 537 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1982), vacated, No.
82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983).
220. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077 (1978), rev'don other grounds, 442 U.S. 330
(1979).
221. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
222. See McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 537 F. Supp. 1282, 1285-87 (D. Minn. 1982), va-
cated, No. 82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983).
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jury test,223 and a "matrix" approach.224
The Eighth Circuit halted the proliferation of standing tests in Mc-
Donald v. Johnson & Johnson,225 in which it adopted the Associated
General analysis.226 It is unclear, however, if the new approach will
yield consistent results within the circuit. The existing case law pro-
vides a wealth of precedents under various tests which, when applied to
specific fact situations, may produce ambiguous, or even inconsistent,
results.227
I Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit clearly applied the foreseeable target area test 228
of antitrust standing until Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker, Inc.229 in 1982.
Under the foreseeable target area approach, the Ninth Circuit courts
223. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir.
1979).
224. TV Signal Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 617 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1980) ("something
more than remote, is not derivative but direct, and is the proximate result of [Defendant's] misdo-
ing."); Ardito v. Johnson & Johnson, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,954, 72,904 (D. Minn. 1982)
("physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff'); Ad-
miral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1295 (D. Neb. 1977) ("causal
connection between plaintiffs' injury and defendants' antitrust violations"), modifed, 585 F.2d 877
(8th Cir. 1978).
225. No. 82-1594 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1983).
226. Id. See also United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 4-82-990 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1983)
(adopting Associated General analysis).
227. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
228. The court of appeals first espoused the test in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). Since that time, courts in
the Ninth Circuit have regularly followed the foreseeable target area test. See, e.g., Program
Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1980); California Com-
puter Prods., Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1979); City of
Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); John
Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 1977); Blankenship v. Hearst
Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481
F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods.,
433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co.,
374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218, 222 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig.,
474 F. Supp. 1072, 1104 n.34 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 862
(N.D. Cal.), dismissed, 403 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Washington v. American Pipe & Con-
str. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961, 963-64 (S.D. Wash. 1967); cf. California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1980) (even if injury is unforsee-
able, court should grant standing if antitrust policies furthered), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
229. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/6
Number 41 ANTITRUST STANDING 1097
granted standing to lessors,230 sellers,23' government agencies, 232 as-
sociations, 233 potential market entrants, 234 and representatives and of-
ficers of injured corporations. 23 - Courts denied standing to
shareholders, creditors, and employees of corporate targets.236
In Ostrofe, 2 37 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals balanced compet-
ing antitrust policies238 and granted standing to a former employee
forced to resign and blacklisted for interfering with an anticompetitive
scheme.239 Although the Supreme Court remanded Ostrofe in light of
Associated General, there is no assurance that the court of appeals will
alter its result on reconsideration. 24°
The Ninth Circuit courts have not agreed on the proper test of anti-
trust standing since Ostrofe. In Aurora Enterprises v. National Broad-
casting Co. ,241 the court of appeals reaffirmed the foreseeable target
area test and cited Ostrofe for the proposition that antitrust standing is
not limited to competitors.242 Aurora suggests that the Ninth Circuit
230. Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967).
231. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
232. Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
233. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
234. Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
908 (1979).
235. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975). But see John Lenore & Co. v.
Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977) (representative without standing when injury
to competition is minimal).
236. Program Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Gutier-
rez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979); Sherman v. British Leyland
Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1979); Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Contrevas v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 484
F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 932 (1974).
237. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
238. Id. at 1380-81.
239. Id. at 1383-84. The Court stated:
It is unnecessary and would be contrary to the purposes of Section 4, to erect an arbi-
trary and absolute bar to treble damage suits for injuries that result from a conspirator's
efforts to implement the anticompetitive aspects of the conspiracy. The interests counsel-
ing restriction of private treble damage actions may outweigh the interests of antitrust
enforcement in some such cases. But the interests of antitrust enforcement may
predominate in others.
Id.
240. See supra notes 80-83 & 154 and accompanying text.
241. 688 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. Id. at 692-93.
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did not abandon the foreseeable target area test in Ostrofe.
In Stein v. United Artists Corp.,u43 however, the court of appeals en-
gaged in a lengthy discussion of policy concerns about duplicative re-
covery before reaffirming target area cases in which courts denied
standing to stockholders.2 " Stein suggests that the Ninth Circuit has
incorporated a policy-balancing component into its foreseeable target
area test.
Subsequently, in Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co.,245 the court of
appeals purported to apply the Associated General analysis, but
couched its discussion solely in terms of antitrust injury. The court
allowed news dealers to sue their publisher for requiring an exclusive
dealing agreement as a condition of news distribution. 46 In Park v.
Watson,247 however, the court of appeals read Associated General as
supplementing the foreseeable target area test.248 These divergent
readings of Associated General provide no consistent guidelines for an-
titrust standing in the Ninth Circuit.2 49
J Tenth Circuit
There is no clear antitrust standing test in the Tenth Circuit. Courts
have recently utilized the direct injury test,250 the traditional target area
test,25I and the policy-balancing approach.2 5 2 In addition, some courts
have declined to adopt any test and look only for "proximate cause."25 3
243. 691 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. Id. at 896-97.
245. 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983).
246. Id at 1370-72.
247. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
248. Id at 658-59.
249. Cf. Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc., 718 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1983) (Associated General
reaffirms traditional approaches to antitrust standing).
250. See, e.g., Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc., v. E.A. Cowen Constr., Inc., 609 F.2d 404
(10th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Nationwide Auto
Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967); Sunergy
Communities, Inc. v. Aristek Properties, Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Colo. 1982); Denver Petro-
leum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
251. See, e.g., H.F. & S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1972).
252. See, e.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1634 (1982).
253. See, e.g., Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978); In re
New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,685 (D.N.M. 1982);
Hecht Co. v. Southern Union Co., 474 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.M. 1979); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970). See also supra note 214.
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Courts in the Tenth Circuit have sometimes used the direct injury
test. These courts have denied standing to car dealers suing manufac-
turers,254 franchisors,255 and employees.256
In HF & S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc. ,257 a district court em-
ployed the traditional target area test to grant a franchisee standing to
sue a franchisor for alleged antitrust violations which reduced the value
of the franchise.258
Some Tenth Circuit courts balance competing antitrust policies to
ensure that a plaintiff's injuries are "proximately caused" by the de-
fendant's allegedly illegal practices.2 59 The increasing importance of
antitrust policies in the Tenth Circuit's determinations is consistent
with the trend away from strict adherence to traditional standing
tests,26 and in line with the approach recommended inAssociated Gen-
eral.261 The Tenth Circuit courts have used this approach to grant
standing to employees.262
K. Eleventh Circuit
Although there is an understandable dearth of cases, it appears that
the Eleventh Circuit will follow the traditional target area test of anti-
trust standing. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit used this test
when they were part of the Fifth Circuit.263
The Georgia District Court reaffirmed its use of the traditional target
area test in 1981 in McDonald v. Saint Joseph's Hospital of Atlanta,
Inc. 26 The court refused to grant a health clinic standing to sue hospi-
254. Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979).
255. Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925
(10th Cir. 1967).
256. Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 576
(1982); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938
(1973).
257. 336 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1972).
258. Id at 116.
259. Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001
(1981); Hecht Co. v. Southern Union Co., 474 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.M. 1979).
260. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
262. Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970).
263. See. e.g., Tugboat, Inc. v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 398 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1975),rev'd,
534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Yam Process Patent Validity & Antitrust Litig., 398 F. Supp.
31 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
264. 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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tals for conspiring to deny staff privileges to the clinic's doctors,2 65 con-
cluding that the clinic was not the target of the hospitals' alleged
violations.266
The Eleventh Circuit continues to use this test even in the wake of
Associated General. In Construction Transport, Inc. v. Florida Rock In-
dustries, Inc.,267 the court utilized the target area test to grant a rock
hauler standing to sue a producer.268 The court stated that the Associ-
ated General approach would produce the same result.269
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Although the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit has not decided
many antitrust standing cases, the limited case law suggests that the
circuit follows the traditional target area test.270 For example, in Stern
v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training Schoolfor Deaconesses & Mis-
sionaries, 71 the district court denied standing to hospital patients who
alleged a conspiracy by hospitals to raise prices.272 Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 2 7 3 may undermine this result, but it does not affect the D.C. Cir-
cuit's application of the traditional target area test.274
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in McCready and Associated Gen-
eral set forth guidelines for determining private antitrust standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. These guidelines, however, leave
265. Id. at 126.
266. Id. at 125-26.
267. 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983).
268. Id at 765.
269. Id See also Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp.,
711 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1983) (conclusory statement of no proximate cause, citing McCready and
Associated General).
270. See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'I Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, 48 F.R.D. 347
(D.D.C. 1969). See also Note, supra note 7, at 552.
271. 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973).
272. Id. at 539.
273. 442 U.S. 330 (1979). InJeiter, the Supreme Court limited the indirect purchaser doctrine
and explicitly granted standing to consumers. For a discussion of the indirect purchaser doctrine,
see Comment, Consumer Standing inAnitrustActions, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 717 (1980). The Supreme
Court has often reiterated the consumer protection purpose of the antitrust laws. See supra notes
85-90 and accompanying text.
274. Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,762 (D.D.C. 1982); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
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broad discretion in the federal circuit courts of appeal. Unless and
until the Supreme Court clearly determines the standing status of each
group of antitrust litigants, conflicts will exist among the circuits. Con-
sequently, the forum in which a plaintiff initiates suit will remain of
critical importance to the litigation.
The proliferation of private antitrust standing tests is a symptom of
the inherent tension between the twin goals of the antitrust laws of pro-
moting an efficient yet competitive economy., Liberal standing restric-
tions protect businesses and consumers from the evils of concentrated
economic power but inhibit efficiency. The trend is clearly away from
inflexible tests of standing which proved too narrowly focused for
courts to apply to the infinite variety of fact patterns arising under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act. While courts' relaxation of standing require-
ments may better serve the goals of antitrust enforcement, potential
litigants are left with little guidance.
Kevin D. Gordon
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